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ABSTRACT: This article explores the entry and spread of IWRM in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region. It traces how the idea of IWRM was promoted and sustained throughout the region by mapping 
key events, actors and networks that were involved in promoting the approach. It highlights the importance of 
regional networks in promoting IWRM and shows how regional dynamics, playing out at the interface between 
the global and local levels, influenced the adoption/adaptation and spread of IWRM. The article finds that the idea 
of IWRM 'hit the ground running' in SADC due to several contributing factors. These include: historical political 
connections between the member countries; historically rooted well-established channels and connections with 
bilateral and multilateral donors; the success of networks such as the Global Water Partnership and WaterNet 
whose mandate was to promote the concept; and the fact that two-thirds of the region’s population live in 
transboundary basins with IWRM providing a suitable hook for transboundary cooperation, often inspired by 
European models. The article further argues that IWRM thrived because of strong donor agendas that were 
adapted by key SADC actors to suit strategic interests. It thus provided a platform for complex politically charged 
negotiations to reconcile apparently divergent goals such as infrastructure vs management and regional vs 
national interests. The practice of IWRM in the region is very much shaped by a conflation of regional, national 
and donor interests and has now acquired a life of its own, despite changing donor priorities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) was convened in Dublin 
in 1992, the idea of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has had an impressive global 
influence. Attention towards formulating and putting into practice the notion of integration has been a 
key focus of water resources managers across the globe. Still, getting to grips with, and translating, a 
rather abstract concept has been challenging (see Bolding et al., 2000; Biswas, 2004; Cardwell et al., 
2006; Hopper, 2006; Molle, 2008; Mehta et al., 2014). Moreover, the principles themselves are broad 
enough to appeal universally like a kind of 'nirvana concept' (Molle, 2008) or work as a 'boundary term' 
(cf. Gieryn, 1999) that different actors in scientific and policy worlds interpret and deploy in different 
ways in accordance with prevailing political interests (see Introduction to this special issue for more 
details). 
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This special issue explores the trajectory of IWRM – its emergence and spread – as well as how it has 
been translated into practice (or not) in southern Africa. Allouche (this issue) deals with the 'birth' and 
emergence of IWRM at the global level, while the country cases document how IWRM has been 
translated in different contexts. This article aims to fill the gap between these two focal areas. Between 
the global and national policy levels, there is another policy arena that can act as a link, fostering the 
downstream – or upstream – flow of policy ideas like IWRM at the regional scale. This article takes as its 
point of departure the question of how IWRM became entrenched in southern Africa with a particular 
focus on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, which in the past two decades 
has witnessed much cooperation and activity around water management, and IWRM more specifically. 
SADC is a political and economic grouping to which practically all the mainland and island states of 
southern Africa belong (see below for its history and composition). 
This article asks: (i) How did IWRM unfold in southern Africa and through which key events and 
actors? (ii) Why did it become so popular in the region even though its popularity is on the wane in 
Europe and elsewhere? and (iii) How has it been shaped and adapted in interaction with the prevailing 
regional dynamics? 
The article is structured as follows. First we present some conceptual ideas on 'regions' and how 
ideas and policies flow within a regional space. The article then provides a brief historical overview of 
the SADC region and water management before looking at the roll out of IWRM in SADC and the key 
role of transboundary waters. The article then looks at the diversity of external donor perspectives and 
practices and the key role played by regional networks such as the Global Water Partnership (GWP) and 
WaterNet, a major research and capacity building regional network. The final sections analyse the 
mixed bag of donor-led experiences and impacts and discuss how and why IWRM became so popular in 
the region. 
METHODS 
We used a mixed set of methods, combining semi-structured interviews of key informants with 
document analysis and internet searches to gather information on the events, processes and issues that 
were involved in the spread of IWRM across southern Africa. Key informants were identified through a 
'snowballing' technique and we thus could map the actors who have contributed to the spread of 
IWRM within the region. We interviewed people through face-to-face interviews and via Skype from 
organisations such as the GWP, the SADC Water Division, Capacity Development in Sustainable Water 
Management (CapNet), the World Bank as well as bilateral donor agencies such as Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, formerly GTZ), Swedish International 
Development Agency (Sida) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and a 
range of policy-makers, consultants and academics. In all, 30 key informants were interviewed. In 
addition, we participated in three (2012, 2013, and 2014) annual WaterNet symposia and also 
interviewed several actors present there. Further, we conducted textual analysis of relevant documents 
such as government policies, donor strategies, academic articles, SADC, GWP documents and 
assessment reports to gain an understanding of the life of IWRM within SADC. 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION, REGIONALISM AND EXTERNAL ACTORS 
Regions occupy a socio-geographical space but they are also socially constructed entities (Langeland, 
2012). Much of the study on regionalisation or regional integration has tended to focus on the 
European context, in particular on the formation of the European Union (EU). Much less attention has 
been devoted to the process of regionalisation in Africa and early interest in the formation of regional 
organisations faded away only to re-emerge early in the 1990s (Mapuva, 2015). Studies of integration in 
southern Africa have largely tended to focus on the economic rationale of integration (Gibb, 2009; 
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Mapuva, 2015) and there has been a tendency to privilege the role of states in the process of 
integration (Söderbaum, 2004). However, as Chan (2011) notes, the independent states that emerged 
in the wake of colonialism – which largely inherited the boundaries and languages of the colonisers – 
suffered from problems of lack of institutional capacity and legitimacy. Moving away from the fixation 
with state-led processes of integration, Söderbaum’s (2004) study of regionalisation processes in 
southern Africa proposed instead to draw on the notion of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA). This 
approach proposes that it is not only states that play a role in the process of integration – rather, there 
are several processes and actors at work, both formal and informal. In the context of southern Africa, 
Söderbaum identifies four such processes; market integration; regime-boosting; shadow regionalism; 
and informal economic regionalism. Söderbaum has focussed on the multidimensional and 
comprehensive nature of regionalism in contemporary southern Africa. These challenge positivist 
approaches with their narrow focus on formal and interstate frameworks that have traditionally 
focused on the economic relationships between South Africa and its neighbours. In understanding 
regionalism, then, it is important to better understand the role of other actors, such as donors, 
international financial institutions and civil society as well as particular dynamics such as transboundary 
waters which in southern Africa have also served to promote regional integration and cooperation. 
The formation of particular regional entities, such as the SADC, then, should be understood not only 
as a process of state-led integration, but as much a result of the workings of other informal and formal 
processes and actors as well. The role of external actors – such as western donors and the World Bank – 
has also been immense in shaping SADC and its water management trajectories. While there is a 
tendency to look at donor – recipient state (African) relations in rather a static and top-down way, our 
approach draws on Whitfield and Fraser (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009) to analyse the complex 
negotiations between donors, national governments and non-state actors and how policies and 
processes are articulated as a result. We also use a historical and diachronic approach (see 
Introduction, this issue) to look at how current processes and policies play out against the backdrop of 
specific historical, economic and political trajectories. This path dependency is critical to understanding 
both regional integration and the related water management processes in southern Africa. While it is 
beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed exposition of the emergence of SADC and other 
historical processes, we offer a snapshot of some of the elements involved in its creation and evolution 
as a regional entity through a water lens. This serves as a backdrop to the ensuing portrayal of the 
water governance trends in the region and how the idea of IWRM came to unfold over time (also see 
Appendix 1 for a historic timeline of key global IWRM dates). 
Colonial legacies and the emergence of SADC 
The contemporary southern African region was produced and consolidated through several hundred 
years of imperialism, colonialism, mining exploitation, racism, state-building, apartheid, anti-apartheid 
struggles, nonracialism, and black nationalism (see Swatuk, 2005, 2008). The emergence of the SADC 
cannot therefore be understood without an appreciation of the chequered history of the region and the 
multidimensionality of processes of regionalisation in a historical context. 
The history of South Africa is important in understanding regional dynamics. South Africa was first 
colonised by Dutch descendants – the Boers who, overtime, called themselves Afrikaners – and then 
later by the British. The two groups vied for political and economic power: the Boers finished with 
political power, and the British with economic affairs. Southern Africa was the core of Anglo-Saxon 
Africa and attracted the lion’s share of British investments (Birmingham, 2008). A key ingredient in the 
colonisation of southern Africa was the emphasis on large-scale transboundary transport networks, 
such as Cecil Rhodes’s idea of building a railway to connect the Cape with Cairo (which never 
materialised). Further, Rhodes combined three territories: southern Rhodesia, northern Rhodesia, and 
Nyasaland – present-day Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, respectively. The Portuguese, who wielded 
power in the then colonies of Mozambique and Angola in particular, were also enamoured like the 
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British, by hubristic transport projects that never materialised, e.g. the coast-to-coast network 
incorporating Angola, Zambia and Mozambique (see e.g. Birmingham, 2008). 
Apart from physically linking territories together through large-scale infrastructure projects, a key 
emphasis was on economic integration. In 1910, the same year that South Africa achieved dominion 
status under the Commonwealth, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was established, the 
world’s oldest customs union. In 1953, the Central African Federation (CAF) was created, consisting of 
Nyasaland and southern and northern Rhodesia, the three territories of the Zambezi valley that Rhodes 
had sought to dominate. Though Rhodes died in 1902, his legacy was long-lasting. Southern Rhodesia 
emerged as the economic, political and military powerhouse of the federation, with Nyasaland 
supplying cheap labour, and northern Zambia offering copper-based wealth. This union took place 
largely to reap the economic benefits of linking labour and wealth closer together. However, it was 
brought down by an increasingly disgruntled black majority in Nyasaland and Zambia only a decade 
later (Birmingham, 2008: Chan, 2011). 
These historical trends implicitly began to pave the way towards regional integration before far 
more explicit political and security interests emerged. In the wake of the struggles for independence 
late in the 1950s and early in the 1960s, countries in the region started engaging in processes of 
forming political coalitions. The era of struggles for independence coincided with the Cold War, with 
the superpowers fighting 'proxy wars' that grew hot, particularly in Angola, Mozambique and South 
West Africa (Namibia). South Africa was the hegemon of the region, busily engaged in attempts to 
destabilise its neighbours (Chan, 2011). In 1976, a group emerged that became known as the Frontline 
States, making up a buffer zone against apartheid South Africa. The coalition consisted of Angola, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and eventually Zimbabwe. Thus, two diametrically opposed 
political, economic and security groupings existed in the region – on the one hand, there was South 
Africa and its homeland satellite system, and on the other there was the Frontline States (Evans, 1986). 
Subsequently, the latter became the driving force for the creation of the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, with the primary purpose of fighting against apartheid. The 
key elements were the mobilisation of international development assistance to the liberation 
movements and mobilising the international community to impose sanctions on the apartheid regime 
to isolate it. The Nordics and like-minded countries wholeheartedly embraced the SADCC, while the 
British used it as compensation for their reluctance to impose sanctions on South Africa. The Cold War 
came to an end at the same time as apartheid was brought to an end in South Africa. 
In August 1992, the SADCC gave way to the creation of the Southern African Development 
Community, or SADC (Mandaza et al., 1994). Today, SADC embraces a huge area of 15 countries 
containing a wealth of diversity in terms of climate, topography, political, socio-economic and cultural 
characteristics. SADC is one of the most important networks in Africa, addressing economic, political 
and security and cultural issues of common interest to community members (Mapuva, 2015). 
After the early 1990s, South Africa became a pivotal player in the newly emerged SADC, being the 
most successful in the group economically. While Mandela saw the role of the state as key for a 
country’s development, his successor, Thabo Mbeki, was more concerned with giving the private sector 
a freer rein to attract foreign capital; his ambitions were not merely concerned with South Africa. His 
desire was to foster a new continent-wide African Renaissance, to demonstrate to the world that, in 
particular, South Africa and SADC were capable of becoming modern (Chan, 2011). SADC, in Mbeki’s 
mind, was meant to be the demonstration vehicle of the African Renaissance project (ibid). The strong 
belief in the power of the private sector to kick-start struggling economies and to embrace neoliberal 
policies aligned well with global economic and political trends at the time. These in part were thwarted 
by Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown in 2000. 
The role of Western donors in the SADC region should not be underestimated. Donors were often 
fronting political and economic interests of their home countries – many Western countries moved 
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from Cold War and anti-apartheid interests to emphasising the supremacy of liberal democracy, 
economic liberalisation, and free markets. These 'Western' interests, which are by no means 
homogeneous (for instance, the US and European countries have widely different aspirations when it 
comes to energy and resource interests in southern Africa), have had to contend with counteracting the 
growing influence of other emerging players such as China (Austin et al., 2008; Meierding, 2011). The 
net result has been a move away from state-centric policies in favour of neoliberal policies and the 
formation of partnerships with states, private markets and civil society actors, which echo Söderbaum’s 
point about the need to understand the process of integration from a less state-centric vantage point. 
To sum up, a multiplicity of driving factors shaped the emergence of the SADC. These included 
imperial interests involving large-scale transboundary transport network plans to link the territories 
together more tightly, economic interests, (e.g. the creation of SACU), and political and security 
interests in the formation of the Frontline States as a bulwark against the regime in Pretoria. These 
colonial and historical legacies still very much shape the cultural, linguistic and political structures of the 
states that make up the community membership and had a bearing on water issues also, to which we 
now turn. 
Trends in southern African water governance 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century were characterised by the emergence of what has 
become dubbed the 'hydraulic mission' (Waterbury, 1979; Allan, 2003; Turton et al., 2004; Molle et al., 
2009). Nation-states and colonial governments engaged in efforts to develop large-scale infrastructure 
to increase the assurance of water supply for various purposes, such as irrigation, energy and mining. 
Powerful state bureaucracies, or 'hydrocracies' (Molle et al., 2009), were created during this period. The 
ethos guiding such developments was often one of conquering nature, and ardent advocates tended to 
"preach often in hyperbolic and lyrical style, the advent of an irrigated Eden" (Molle et al., 2009: 330). 
One of the grandest projects in the region at the time was the Orange River project. With respect to 
colonial governments’ engagement, the British furthered their interests through engaging in the 
building of the Kariba Dam in the 1950s to serve the copperbelt and expanding industries in northern 
and southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively). The Portuguese colonial 
government, for its part, ordered the building of the Cabora Bassa Dam (also modelled on the TVA), 
which was completed in 1974. 
As outlined in the Introduction to this Special issue (see also Timeline in Appendix), in the 1990s, 
supply-oriented paradigms gave way to demand-led approaches. This led to the scaling back of 
government, the promotion of structural adjustment and the promotion of water as an economic good 
as well as approaches that used economic incentives to increase the so-called water use efficiency. 
These issues were firmly entrenched in dominant World Bank documents of the time (e.g. World Bank, 
1993; Briscoe, 1996) as well as in the so-called Dublin Principles, which are considered by many as the 
'birth' of modern day IWRM (see Allouche and the Introduction, this issue). However, some elements of 
IWRM were around earlier in the region. For instance, in South Africa, some elements of what came to 
be known as IWRM were already present in the 1970 Commission (Movik et al., this issue). This was 
also the case in Mozambique where the 1991 water law included IWRM principles before Dublin (Alba 
and Bolding, in this issue). It is also worth noting that some donors argued that they had been involved 
in IWRM ever since the 1960s or so. 
The 1993 World Bank Water Resources Strategy promoted a particular version of IWRM based on 
the French/Ruhr models, which emphasised management at the river basin level and water pricing. 
Later that same year, the World Bank, along with the German aid organisation GTZ (later GIZ), took its 
strategic ideas to a meeting at Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe with the aim of pushing the rationale of 
economic valuation. The fact that there was a drought in the region at the time forcefully brought 
home the challenges of water security, and also coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
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many countries in the region starting to 'look West instead of East' (interview with GTZ official, April 
2014). Many countries started introducing market-based reforms. This brief overview shows how the 
initial emphasis on infrastructure and providing access to water faltered in favour of an increasing 
emphasis on market mechanisms and a neoliberal turn in thinking about water governance which 
allowed for a domination of the 1992 Dublin version of IWRM. These trends in water governance in part 
mirror the colonial project: from the hydraulic mission (even though this largely served the white 
minority) to state-led development, to the still prevailing neoliberal turn. These wider trends of course 
interacted with regional transboundary dynamics to which we now turn. 
ROLLING OUT IWRM IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION 
Transboundary waters as a catalyst for IWRM 
The many shared river basins in southern Africa (SADC has 15 major river basins that are 
transboundary) are a (unintended) legacy from the scramble for Africa, hence the need to share water 
resources across nations. Today’s global and national policy-makers are using the river basins to create 
integration in the region (see Swatuk, 2005). Transboundary issues have always been high on donor and 
SADC agendas. According to some authors, transboundary issues played a more forceful role than 
political boundaries (Asmal and Vale, 1999). 
A Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems was created in 1995 and a revised version entered into 
force in the 2003 Framework (SADC, 2010). It originated out of earlier work and debates on the 
development of regional legislation for the development of the Zambezi River Action Plan (ZACPLAN) 
(Granit, 2000; Mohamed, 2003). The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was an important 
driver in the process of drafting the protocol based on the ZACPLAN experiences. The Protocol 
envisaged contributing to the development and management of shared international basins, suggesting 
equitable division and sharing of benefits. As the region’s scarce water resources needed to be shared 
between different basin States, negotiation and cooperation were required to ensure no harm was 
done to any party (Mohamed, 2003).1 The Protocol was drafted two years prior to the 1997 Helsinki 
protocol, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses strongly influenced the revision of the Protocol (Merrey, 2009). 
In the words of a member of staff at the GWP-SA head office in Pretoria: 
Transboundary issues cannot be underestimated. The SADC has fifteen transboundary basins, and many of 
those basins have prepared development plans, which I would say to a greater or lesser extent are based 
on IWRM principles. Many start with IWRM plans so we could probably say that IWRM covers about 120 
million people. They cover different countries, and are not local, but international plans. Transboundary 
issues hence have been very important in terms of driving the IWRM agenda. For instance, the 
Mozambican water policy on integrated water resources management was largely driven by concerns over 
shared watercourses, particularly with South Africa (Interview, July 2013). 
According to a former member of the SADC Secretariat, who now works for a consultancy company in 
South Africa, the focus on implementing IWRM in transboundary basins clearly contributed to reducing 
conflicts. Even though he is critical of the concept of IWRM – perceiving it as being too broad to be of 
any practical use – he pointed out the beneficial ramifications of implementing IWRM plans in a 
                                                          
1
 The Protocol was also revised in 2000 (SADC, 2000) to accommodate the requests of the Mozambicans with respect to the 
possibility offered by the original text to carve river systems up in different watercourse systems. The latter could then in 
theory be unilaterally developed by one riparian state, evading the possibility of other riparian states to have a say in this. 
Mozambique as a downstream nation of many transboundary rivers was very keen on avoiding being left out of any upstream 
decision-making. The revised protocol was ratified in 2005.  
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transboundary basin, as these plans helped promote cooperation and defuse potential controversies 
between states (interview, July 2013). 
The Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems had a galvanising effect on the establishment of river 
basin organisations (RBOs). There was a strong donor hand in all of them. For example, the Orange-
Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM), which was established in 2000, continues to receive donor 
funding. ORASECOM was followed by Limpopo Watercourse Commission (LIMCOM) in 2011 and by the 
Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM) also in 2011 (see Appendix 2 for further details on key 
transboundary institutions in southern Africa). The contribution of RBOs to fostering regional 
cooperation cannot be underestimated. This process however entails intense negotiation as nations 
also try their best to protect national interests whilst participating in regional transboundary processes. 
Take the case of the Zambezi River Basin, SADC’s largest (in terms of size and number of countries) 
and Africa’s fourth largest river basin. The Central African Federation (CAF) is engaged in its own 
hydraulic mission through instigating the building of the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River between 
Zambia (then northern Rhodesia) and Zimbabwe (then southern Rhodesia) to supply electricity to the 
copper mines in Zambia and to the farms and cities of Rhodesia. Three decades later, in the mid-
eighties, the donor-supported ZACPLAN initiative was launched to promote the integrated management 
of the Zambezi. Discussions began in 1999 and in 2004, the Zambezi River Commission (ZAMCOM) 
agreement was signed. Still it did not enter into force until 2011, mainly because the countries involved 
in the agreement were concerned about accommodating their own national infrastructure interests 
within the transboundary IWRM framework. Zambia, for example, was concerned that the agreement 
did not reflect the fact that most of the water flowing in the Zambezi originates in Zambia with up to 
70.2% of the country’s population of 11 million living in the basin and most of the country’s electricity 
met from the basin’s hydropower stations. In a sense, then, these protracted negotiations represent a 
confluence of the hydraulic mission and infrastructure development initiatives with the ´softer´ aspects 
of creating a regional institutional platform for IWRM through ZAMCOM (see Chanda, 2004; Matemu, 
2013; Gwaunza, 2014; Tauya, 2015 for more details on the ZAMCOM process). We now examine SADC’s 
role in regional water management and also how it has dealt with and negotiated these various 
tensions. 
The role of SADC 
It can be argued that coordination and integration of the water sector were achieved in part because of 
the restructuring within SADC. Early on, each country was assigned a specific sector responsibility. The 
SADC’s water agenda was driven by the Water Sector Coordination Unit (SADC-WSCU), which was set 
up in 1992 in Maseru, Lesotho. This approach resulted in a situation where countries pursued their own 
narrow interests within the sector mandate, rather than the collective good of the region (Isaksen, 
2004; Söderbaum, 2004). This is why since 2001, SADC operations have been centralised at the SADC 
Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana. The SADC-WSCU was dissolved in 2002 and staff relocated to 
Gaborone in Botswana to become SADC Water Division in the Directorate of Infrastructure and 
Services, one of the eight directorates.2 
The SADC Water Division was co-responsible for the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses, and water issues in the region. A year after the drafting of the 1995 Protocol, SADC 
                                                          
2
 The logic of placing water with the Directorate of Infrastructure and Services (IS) is not known to us. While housing all 
Secretariat activities in Botswana allowed for centralised coordination, challenges remained (Tjønneland et al., 2005). Take 
irrigation for example: It could easily fall in the Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR). But the 
southern Africa Regional Dialogue on Agriculture found that the intention to use water for irrigation was captured in the 
Regional Strategic Action Plan on Integrated Water Resources Development and Management. Yet the responsibility of 
executing this vision rests with the Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, many of our interviewees 
lamented that irrigation seemed to fall in the crevices of the two directorates.  
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decided on the necessity of developing Regional Strategic Action Plans (RSAPs) on Integrated Water 
Resources Development and Management (IWRM) that would provide direction and detail with respect 
to IWRM implementation in the region. The first RSAP was developed with support from the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1997 (SADC, 1998).3 Under the auspices of the RSAP a 
regional water policy was promulgated, which sought to harmonise legal frameworks, served to 
consolidate policy provisions on water into one single document, and emphasised IWRM as an 
instrument of peace and reinforcement of regional integration (SADC, 2006). The Regional Water Policy 
was complemented and supported by a Regional Water Strategy (SADC, 2007). 
The emphases of the various RSAPs illustrate the tension between the 'soft' water management 
issues promoted by donors drawing on IWRM and the 'hard' aspects concerning infrastructure and 
water resources development that member states favoured. In this regard, it is worth noting that IWRM 
under the RSAP includes (infrastructure) development, which was a hard-won concession SADC 
obtained from donors who were intent on the soft issues of IWRM (Swatuk, 2005). There has been 
what can be called a begrudging mutual acceptance on the part of donors that member countries are 
interested in 'hard IWRM', which includes infrastructure development.4 
The first RSAP was all about creating an enabling environment for IWRM. This includes member 
states introducing water reforms and harmonising their water policies and laws. RSAP II, in addition to 
committing to creating an enabling environment, also boldly declared an interest in water resources 
development and not just water management. Infrastructure Development Support was identified as 
the centrepiece of the plan (SADC, 2005). RSAP III and RSAP IV have followed along similar lines. While 
it may appear that the move from the managerial and institutional aspects of water management 
towards a clearer focus on infrastructure development is not adequately supported by a concomitant 
surge in investments, it is important to bear in mind that RSAPs are supposed to create the enabling 
framework for infrastructure development. Financing infrastructure is the responsibility of national 
governments – they have the mandate to mobilise resources through the traditional vehicles such as 
the World Bank,5 African Development Bank, and bilateral arrangements. One might however ask what 
exactly has been achieved by this massive focus on creating an enabling environment and what it 
means for people on the ground. One of the key authors of the RSAP III said: 
Of course, we’ve done a lot of work to create an enabling environment in SADC, to create plans, policies 
and also build capacity – but sometimes, I think the criticism is well founded. What is the point of getting 
locked into policies, plans, reform and building capacity, etc.; if people are still walking five miles for water? 
In SADC, most focus has been on getting the policy right and, of course, developing the right policies and 
institutions all take time. In sum, it’s been a period of about ten or 15 years that has been used to create an 
enabling environment, but the time has come to move beyond the enabling phase to get things done on 
the ground and improve access to water (Interview with one of the RSAP authors, July 2013). 
A GIZ staff member who spent seven years in the region explained the need to focus on both water 
resources development and management: 
I agree with the criticism that IWRM can be a distraction from infrastructure development and water 
resources development. This is why we always made sure that we focused on distinct things in different 
                                                          
3
 Since then there has been a steady stream of the action plans, such as RSAP II (2000-2005), RSAP III (2010-2015) (SADC, 2005; 
SADC, 2010) and RSAP IV (2016-2020) which is about to be published. RSAPs are credited with defining and promoting water-
related aspects of Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the overall development plan of the region. The 
RISDP (2015–2020) prioritises industrialisation, infrastructure development, and market integration, alongside security and 
peace (see Ganetsang, 2016).  
4
 This is despite the fact that donors have not really committed to financing infrastructure under the auspices of the RSAP.  
5
 Of course, the World Bank plays a double agent role of promoting IWRM using grants and offers of loans to construct dams 
etc. The role of China and its Exim Bank in infrastructure development is massive but beyond the focus of this article.  
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phases and we also identified infrastructure needs at both the national and regional level and also went 
around all 15 member States at the level of the utilities. This is why the regional strategic action plans 
focused on both IWRM and development (Interview, April 2014). 
There is thus an IWRM conundrum in southern Africa – while infrastructure development and 
particularly storage are regarded as important in a region where water availability is characterised by 
tremendous variability and where millions still lack access to water, it is not the conventional focus of 
the IWRM donors, unless the focus is on small infrastructure. Rather it is individual nations that either 
on their own or in cooperation with other countries fund infrastructure projects. This is illustrated by 
the fact that all infrastructure development projects are undertaken under the auspices of bilateral 
arrangements.6 
There is also the wider political economy of SADC which cannot be underestimated. Due to its 
dependence on donor funding SADC can often struggle to implement its own priorities, which as 
outlined earlier, are by no means uniform given the diversity of its member states. Of the SADC funding 
79% comes from donors (Ganetsang, 2016) with only 21% coming from member states7 and one can 
imagine that much of that funding is spent on personnel, travel and so on, leaving much less for 
programmatic activities. SADC needs an estimated USD500 million over the next few years to fund the 
current Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). There are calls to reduce dependency 
on donor funding and develop financial sustainability as articulated by the current Chair of SADC, 
Botswana’s President Ian Khama, in August 2015: "While we recognize the support of our international 
partners, it is necessary for SADC to find other ways of financing our regional agendas" (quoted in 
Ganetsang, 2016). The next section continues the focus on donor priorities and perspectives. 
Donor perspectives and projects 
In this section, we highlight some of the perspectives held by former and existing, mostly bilateral, 
donor representatives on the role they played in IWRM roll out in the region. While this is by no means 
a comprehensive account of all existing donor-led projects and views, we use this material to offer an 
insight into how IWRM took on meaning and momentum in the region. As stated earlier, donor 
presence has been critical in water management in SADC, both around regional-level initiative to guide 
the reform of policies and laws in national contexts and in the establishment of River Basin 
Organisations and transboundary programmes. As we now outline, some donors were inspired by 
water management systems in their own countries and used those ideas in their work; others were 
starting de novo and were excited about the challenges of working both with national governments and 
other donors to kick-start new programmes. 
In the early 1990s, some donor representatives were seconded to ministries, such as the case for the 
Germans and Dutch in Zimbabwe (Manzungu and Derman, this issue) and the Dutch in Mozambique 
(Alba and Bolding, this issue). One of our key informants, a German who worked in Zimbabwe for many 
years in what was then the National Coordinating Committee for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 
remarked that "the Zimbabwean government definitely felt a sense of ownership over the programme; 
there were not many foreigners in the Ministry working on the policy side of things" (interview, April 
2014). He explicitly said that they drew on German experiences, particularly regarding groundwater 
regimes but did not use the vocabulary of IWRM when working in Zimbabwe. 
A Dutch academic who has been in and out of the region since the mid-1990s reflected on the Dutch 
influence on IWRM and water management in the region (see also Alba and Bolding, this issue). 
                                                          
6
 The Lesotho Highlands Project is a good case in point.  
7
 The level of contribution depends on the size of the economy with South Africa accounting for 20% of the SADC budget, 
followed by oil-rich Angola (Ganetsang, 2016).  
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In the good old days before aid was tied, we had fantastic programmes around water supply and river 
basin organisations. Our experts were seconded to Ministries in African countries. I know some people in 
the World Bank think that the Dutch have promoted soft options in Africa while building dykes back home. 
But this is not true. Working under the umbrella of IWRM should not be seen to mean that water resources 
are not developed. Given all the challenges from climate change and seasonal variation, we need smart 
ways to enhance storage whilst reducing environmental costs. The Dutch impact in the region through 
WaterNet has also been immensely successful (Interview, November 2014). 
Some would disagree and contend that IWRM pushed by the donors such as the Dutch in the region has 
led to the prioritising of environmental and management issues over infrastructure concerns. Other 
donors like the Danish had more diverse conceptualisations of IWRM. With regard to Danida’s role in 
supporting IWRM in SADC, there seemed to be quite a heated debate within the organisation about 
what IWRM actually constituted. According to a key informant who was working with Danida at the 
time: 
Danida supported IWRM and the SADC regional programme. However, the problem was that anything that 
had anything to do with water was considered to be IWRM. It could be irrigation, it could be crop rotation, 
it could be anything. The broad scope of IWRM led to it having a lot of meaning, it was like a religion, and 
Torkil [Jønch-Clausen] was one of the preachers (…) He was very stubborn and very pushy. But it was 
admirable too as he put in a lot of energy and travelled around the world. The bottom line is that you 
would not have an agenda without such individuals (Interview, April 2013). 
As discussed by others in this Special Issue, Torkil Jønch-Clausen emerged as someone who wielded a 
great deal of influence, both at the Dublin conference itself and also through his work in Uganda in the 
1990s (Allouche, this issue; Nicol and Odinga, this issue). Apart from this high-level strategic work, 
Danida also associated the IWRM concept with local-level livelihood generation projects and initiated a 
series of IWRM pilot projects in southern Africa (see Movik et al., this issue) that took IWRM to the 
ground, focusing explicitly on local-level water management issues. This was done together with the 
International Water Management Institute (IWMI) which has been prominent in advancing a livelihoods 
and African smallholder perspective on IWRM (see Merrey et al., 2005; Van Koppen, 2007; Merrey, 
2008). 
The Norwegians, through Norad, had a long history of engagement in water management in 
southern and Eastern Africa, particularly focusing on drinking water and hydropower schemes. In 
Tanzania, Norad had been involved in supporting various hydropower schemes such as Kidatu (1979), 
Mtera (1980) as well as the Pangani Falls (1995), largely drawing on their competence from building 
hydropower at home (see also Van Koppen et al., this issue). According to one of our interviewees, a 
former Norad employee who now works for the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, 
IWRM was something they had been doing 'all along' (interview, April 2013). Norad was a keen 
supporter of IWRM until about the end of the 1990s, when political support within Norway for water as 
a development theme waned. 
In contrast, Sweden, through Sida, chose to take an explicitly regional focus in addition to funding 
some smaller projects, such as catchment councils in Zimbabwe. In 1995, Sida developed a strategy to 
guide its support for water resources management in the SADC region that emphasised two focal areas. 
One was competence in building and awareness-raising about the interconnected nature of water 
resources, and the other area concerned the need for IWRM-infused collaborative governance on 
shared watercourses as a means to avert potential conflicts (Granit and Johansson, 1995). The strategy 
states that "to ensure that the needs of all actors are met, integrated management of the drainage 
basin is the only point of departure for planning water resources utilisation" (Granit and Johansson, 
1995: 10, authors’ translation) and calls for "neutral support to regional river basin commissions" (ibid: 
12). The strategy highlights how the idea of IWRM has developed over a long period of time, drawing 
attention to the overarching framework for management of shared rivers present in the report of the 
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Helsingfors committee (ibid). The collaboration between three Nordic donors supported the 
development of the Zambezi River Action Plan (ZACPLAN). 
Sweden has had a long-term involvement in water resources management in the SADC region, 
building on well-established contacts as highlighted by a key informant from Sida based in Harare at the 
time: 
There were already well-established networks in the region – it was very dynamic and very supportive…. 
there were already strong partners present, and a good dialogue. The main focus was on transboundary, 
rather than national-level IWRM, and there was a lot of activity in the late 1990s and the early 2000s with a 
lot of buzz and training (Interview, April 2013). 
The Germans through GIZ (then known as GTZ) also focused on transboundary IWRM, in addition to 
working with national governments. One German key informant worked with SADC on transboundary 
issues for seven years (interview, April 2014). He helped set up the SADC Water Division in 2006 and 
was also involved in setting up the SADC Transboundary Water Management programme.8 The 
programme had three tiers: macro (SADC); meso (river basin); and micro (national).9 He also 
coordinated bilateral and multilateral donor efforts in the water sector in SADC amongst all 
International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) to monitor who was doing what around IWRM and in which 
country. All this work took place under the umbrella of IWRM – as he put it "like all other forms of 
development cooperation, we had to follow the Zeitgeist and the Zeitgeist then was IWRM". He related 
how the greater part of the GIZ-led programme got its funding from the Australians and the British and 
how there were a diversity of actors involved – NGOs, private companies as well as RBOs in Africa, 
Europe and Australia with a lot of cross learning. For example, the ORASECOM was directly influenced 
by the models followed in the Danube, Rhine and also Mekong cases. 
As for multilateral donors, the World Bank exercised a great deal of influence in particular at the 
national level (see, e.g. Derman and Manzungu for Zimababwe, and Alba and Bolding for Mozambique, 
this issue). The Bank has long emphasised regional integration in its strategies (SADC-WD et al., 2008; 
World Bank, 2010) and one outcome of this emphasis was the establishment of the multi-donor trust 
fund Co-operation for International Waters in Africa (CIWA) in 2011, in partnership with the Nordic 
donors (Sweden, Denmark, Norway) as well as the Netherlands and the UK. CIWA’s focus is on fostering 
growth, strengthening institutions, and facilitating investments for transboundary water resources 
management, drawing on the Bank’s technical expertise on international waters. 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) has also played a role in promoting IWRM. It launched its 
IWRM strategy in 2000, and IWRM continues to be emphasised in its long-term strategy (2013-2022). In 
an independent evaluation of the Bank’s policy over a ten-year period (2000-2010), it is stated that 
though the policy is still relevant, it needs to be updated and adjusted to reflect the new challenges 
facing the continent, such as climate change, food security and inclusive growth. It appears that the 
AfDB’s focus has very much been on single infrastructure projects, mainly drinking water supply with 
emphasised issues such as cost recovery and water pricing, a good case in point for which is Harare’s 
water supply reform. When asked whether the emphasis had shifted from water resources 
management and development to water supply and sanitation, the official said that IWRM was still the 
guiding principle which allowed donors to (1) integrate water and sanitation rather than just look at 
                                                          
8
 This was a GIZ technical cooperation programme between the German Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit (BMZ, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development Cooperation) and SADC. 
9
 Macro or SADC level; meso at the river basin level inspired by German transboundary river systems, which had successful 
twinning programmes between southern Africa and Europe; and finally, micro at the national level. When asked, he 
acknowledged that the ‘local’ - or community level - was missing from the ‘micro’ level apart from a few IWRM pilot projects 
focused at the village level that were led by the Danes. He also said: “In the early days it had been ‘a one-man show’ with 5 
million Euros but when I left it had 10 staff members and a budget eight times bigger”.  
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water; as well as (2) build capacity and institutional structures in-country; and (3) create better policies 
and facilitate a water reform process (interview with AfDB official, 1 November 2012). 
The impressions we get from the submissions of donor representatives point towards a mixed bag of 
experiences. Some donors had close bilateral relations with particular countries, having worked, for 
instance, on water and sanitation and hydropower projects (such as Norad in Tanzania) or being 
seconded to water ministries as experts, such as the case for the Germans in Zimbabwe and for the 
Dutch in Mozambique. Many of the Dutch experts seconded to line ministries were there as a result of 
historical precedent, for reasons of solidarity with Mozambique and Zimbabwe in the anti-apartheid 
struggle. Some individuals played key roles as 'policy entrepreneurs' spreading the idea of IWRM. Some, 
such as the Swedes and Germans, chose to work at 'both ends', not only offering support at the 
national level, but also taking an explicitly regional view of water resources management. This resulted 
in a split between the national-level IWRM piloting and support projects and the more explicitly 
regional-level IWRM transboundary approach espoused by UNDP, Sida and GIZ among others. These 
efforts at transboundary institution-building were often couched in somewhat instrumentalist terms as 
promoting peacebuilding and reducing the risk of conflicts. 
SADC played the role as a conduit for donor funds to set up the various River Basin Commissions as 
well as coordinating policy and legal reforms. It may be argued that while the early stages of support 
might have seen more leaning towards the advisory roles and direct government placements, the donor 
focus has increasingly become centred on SADC as a means of channelling donor funds, regional 
networks and transboundary commissions. These efforts reflected donor agendas and the prevailing 
zeitgeist of the times. The next section will explore in greater detail two of the most important regional 
networks in promoting IWRM, namely the Global Water Partnership (GWP) and the WaterNet. 
THE ROLE OF IMPLEMENTING AGENTS: GWP AND WATERNET 
In 1996, the same year as SADC’s WSCU was set up, the Global Water Partnership (GWP) was created. 
GWP regional networks were established all over the world, one of the more dynamic ones being the 
Southern African network (GWP-Southern Africa, GWP-SA for short). GWP-SA was established in 2000 
and was the first regional branch of GWP in Africa to be launched. In the 1990s, GWP-SA’s regional 
head office was in Harare in Zimbabwe until it was moved to Pretoria in the early 2000s to be hosted by 
the International Water Management Institute (IWMI). The GWP and its Technical Advisory Committee 
(TAC) played a key role in incorporating the Dublin principles on IWRM in SADC states and coordinated 
donor efforts in this area (see Savenije and van der Zaag, 2000). 
Among GWP-SA’s main activities are the SADC Water Day and the Annual Water Research 
Symposium, hosted together with the Water Research Fund for Southern Africa (WARFSA) and 
WaterNet, which also offers training in IWRM (see below). GWP-SA was appointed by SADC as an 
implementing agent for stakeholder participation and RBOs dialogue under RSAP II. In this way, GWP-
SA works closely with the SADC Water Division in supporting regional water-related processes by 
ensuring stakeholder involvement and raising awareness of the importance of IWRM in regional 
development.10 A recent review of GWP (2008) brought to light a number of challenges, including high 
administrative costs, and the perception that regions are too autonomous and are not seen to follow 
the recommendations from the Secretariat. 
Over the years, GWP-SA has grown rapidly into a regional network of over 350 Partner Organisations 
that, in turn, have formed a number of Country Water Partnerships (CWP), and 12 out of the 15 SADC 
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 It is also the executing agency for Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)-funded Partnership for Africa’s Water 
Development (PAWD). PAWD focuses on support to national IWRM frameworks, institutional development of multi-
stakeholder national and regional water partnerships and the integration of water into PRSPs (CIDA, 2009).  
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countries now have their own CWP. The Partnership enjoys multi-donor support (e.g. from the Swedes, 
Danes, Germans and Dutch), contributions by governments and voluntary contributions from many 
partners to ensure a coordinated approach to water management and development. 
Apart from mobilising regional and national multi-stakeholder platforms in national development 
planning processes, identifying IWRM training needs and target groups, and informing IWRM research 
priorities and policy content, a key activity of the GWP-SA is to provide technical expertise in 
regional/national water policy development and implementation processes. A key informant at the 
GWP-SA head office said that: 
As GWP we advise governments to develop both IWRM plans and also enshrine them in policies; 
otherwise, it will be left to the whims of the current government. We are only an advisory body and we 
build the capacity of various members to roll out IWRM and to capture lessons from other countries for 
learning and sharing. But of course, there are challenges. Developing an IWRM plan in isolation of a 
national institution makes no sense – e.g. a catchment can cross three districts. Small countries do better 
than larger ones. Zimbabwe was a real success story in the 1990s due to its excellent policies at the 
catchment level, which however changed in the 2000s due to land reform; otherwise, it would still be the 
shining star of IWRM (….). In the beginning there was a sense that a Western idea was being rolled out but 
over time, people moved away from that viewpoint. The World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(Rio+10) in Johannesburg in 2002 changed that because in southern Africa we made a conscious decision to 
promote IWRM in the region. Water Ministers also welcomed the principle but it has been more difficult to 
get agriculture and irrigation ministers on board (Interview, July 2013). 
In response to the question whether IWRM was too abstract, the same informant said: 
We are criticised for only staying at the planning level and some say we need to move to the ground – but 
we don’t have the resources to help with implementation. The key challenge is the lack of capacity 
amongst the various stakeholders. Also countries may not have the financial resources to undertake the 
change. In Botswana, it was only when the Minister of Finance had bought in the idea that things began to 
take off (Interview, July 2013). 
Another key factor in the promotion of IWRM has been the technical and professional training provided 
by WaterNet, which has the status of a SADC subsidiary institution responsible for IWRM capacity 
building with a secretariat based at the University of Zimbabwe in the Civil Engineering Department in 
Harare. The largely Dutch (but also Swedish)-funded network has more than 70 members, most of 
whom are tertiary-level training institutions. The flagship for WaterNet is the regional IWRM Masters’ 
degree programme. Core modules are offered at the University of Zimbabwe and University of Dar es 
Salaam with specialisations offered at other SADC institutions.11 It is thus a quite unique regional 
programme as institutions offer course modules in which they have comparative strength (see Jonker et 
al., 2012). WaterNet seeks to "produce sufficient well-trained specialists as well as new type of 
generalists in water resources (…) expected to constitute the 'middle ground' in integrated water 
resources development and management" (Jonker et al., 2012: 4227). Between 2003 and 2011, 251 
students from 18 African countries graduated with Master’s theses on water and many of these are 
presented at WaterNet conferences (ibid). The Water Research Fund for Southern Africa (WARFSA), 
which was initially funded by Sida, has complemented WaterNet activities (Krugmann, 2002).12 Its main 
objective is very specific to IWRM, namely to "promote and facilitate the implementation of 
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 Such as the Polytechnic of Namibia (Water supply and sanitation), the University of the Western Cape in South Africa (Water 
and society), University of Malawi (Water and environment), University of KwaZulu Natal (GIS and Earth Observation), and 
University of Botswana (Water and land). 
12
 This explains the annual symposium dedicated to promoting IWRM in the region and known as the WaterNet/WARFSA/GWP 
symposium (see below). 
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multidisciplinary research projects in integrated water resources management in the [SADC] region" 
(Krugmann, 2002).13 
Dutch academics have played key roles in the establishment of WaterNet. According to one of them:  
The Maseru Statement highlighted the need for capacity building in the region. We used this to argue to 
our then Foreign Minister to justify the creation of WaterNet. In 2000, WaterNet was launched at Victoria 
Falls by the Prince of Orange, now King [Willem-Alexander]. We decided to focus at the Master’s level and 
offer one integrated degree drawing on different perspectives rather than different disciplines. IWRM 
appeared to be the easiest way to organise this degree and nobody was against it then. The Prince had 
been influenced by the Dublin Principles, because he had been there. I consider myself as 'integrated' given 
my mixed educational background. From the beginning, I’ve been critical of the concept of IWRM and have 
always tried to find local equivalents. WaterNet links 65 departments and institutions in southern and 
eastern Africa. Apart from the Master’s degree, it offers a platform for water professionals in the region to 
get together annually. The journal 'Physics and Chemistry of the Earth' does one special issue every year on 
southern African water issues and the papers are derived from the symposium. This journal includes 15% 
of all research on water in southern Africa. Thus, WaterNet has encouraged academics in southern Africa 
to get on with publishing in an international journal, something they were not encouraged to do earlier 
(Interview, November 2014). 
Anybody who has attended a WaterNet symposium will agree that it is an inclusive network that 
encourages and builds research capacity and collaboration between senior and junior researchers who 
present their research in a collaborative way at the annual meeting. It also serves as an important 
vehicle to bring policy-makers and researchers together. However, it must be said that the scientific 
quality varies. IWRM is also used very loosely and rather vaguely for all sessions and papers, be they on 
hydrology, water quality, water and socio-economic development, climate change, modelling or on 
gender issues.14 
There is no doubt that WaterNet and GWP-SA have promoted IWRM in the region and have had a 
lot of influence reflected in the fact that water laws, policies and institutions have been changed in line 
with IWRM in many southern African countries. What all this means to poor women and men on the 
ground will be the focus of the country papers that follow in this Special Issue. 
DISCUSSION 
This article analysed both policy development and interview material to ask why IWRM became so 
popular in the southern African region. We have highlighted the role of both formal and informal actors 
and processes as well as the role of non-State and external actors such as donors who facilitated the 
spread of IWRM. We have demonstrated that interpretations of IWRM differ in many ways, not least 
with respect to the role of infrastructure for development within IWRM. Also countries in SADC have 
approached IWRM in different ways and have progressed in different ways. Generally, however, policy, 
legislation and strategy are ahead of implementation. Only Zambia and South Africa have made real 
headway with regard to integrating water planning with broader economic development planning 
frameworks, and even there, there are challenges in integration as demonstrated in the South African 
cases in this special issue. 
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 An evaluation undertaken in 2002 found positive outcomes such as the involvement of over 100 researchers (including 
young professionals) and the funding of many important research projects. The evaluation also found little collaboration across 
the region (only two out of 23 projects had aspects of collaboration with most funding going to Zimbabwe) and not much on 
the multidisciplinary aspects of IWRM (see Krugmann, 2002).   
14
 The 16th WaterNet symposium in Mauritius in October 2015 was the first that dropped IWRM from its title - instead, 'water 
security' figured in the programme heading. 
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The regional strategies of the SADC, while first concentrating on 'soft' issues of institutions and 
policies, have recognised the importance of 'hardware' within the IWRM framework. Infrastructure 
development is clearly a key regional interest, which explains the inclusion of 'D' in IWRM in SADC 
documents, which as Swatuk has highlighted, represented a triumph on the part of SADC to ensure that 
IWRM did not exclude infrastructure development, which donors were not keen on (2005). It is, 
however ironical that the 'D' is silent because instead of IWRDM, it is IWRM which is emblazoned on 
SADC documents. This illustrates the delicate negotiations regarding IWRM in the SADC region where 
there is much dependence on donors. The multiplicity of transboundary river basins in the region has 
also been very important for the spread of IWRM which also adds yet another layer of complexity. 
While countries have had to share hydrological information and also cooperate on infrastructure 
development as in the case of the Orange, Komati and Zambezi basins, all these have been 
characterised by intense political negotiations. This is why commissions have taken long to come into 
force as illustrated by events in the Zambezi where it took two decades for ZAMCOM to come into force 
(see Chanda, 2004; Tauya, 2015). For downstream countries such as Mozambique, the entry point to 
IWRM was through transboundary concerns (see Alba and Bolding, this issue) and IWRM 
transboundary-style, was driven far more by internal concerns rather than being imposed from outside 
by donors and regional networks such as the GWP. In contrast, upstream riparian countries did not 
necessarily share the same interest in cooperation. 
While national interests determined how particular trajectories of negotiations played out in specific 
river basins and in the various national spaces, the role of external actors in the form of bilateral and 
multilateral donors has been immense. The already extensive collaborative bilateral and multilateral 
networks existing in the region, partly due to the historical legacies of supporting anti-apartheid and 
decolonisation struggles, facilitated the activities of the donors in terms of promoting the IWRM 
message. According to several key informants, it was just a matter of using existing channels to 
promote a new message rather than forging new grounds of collaboration, which would have been 
much more time-consuming. 
The global shift to neoliberal policies in the water sector from 1992 also chimed well with IWRM roll 
out and its emphasis on water permits, licences, etc. The involvement of external agents was further 
facilitated through the emergence and consolidation of the establishment of a defined political and 
economic identity through the formation of first the SADCC, and then the SADC. The SADC’s explicit aim 
of engaging donors actively ensured that a vibrant network was established, which created the 
rudimentary infrastructures and nodes on which other initiatives could piggyback, as several of the 
informants from donor agencies have highlighted. This facilitated a form of both formal and informal 
integration, through the establishment of regional networks and nodes that were geared towards 
promoting water resources management. In a sense then, the SADC could perhaps be viewed as a 
donor construct that facilitated the spread of a particular discourse on IWRM. Donors also played a key 
role in reforming water legislations and policies, on creating the 'right' institutions, and building 
capacity and networks across basins and countries. Many Western water academics, for their part, 
seem to play a dual role. Despite being very critical of the concept, they are also at times part of the 
IWRM bandwagon, not least due to the opportunities offered to teaching in Master’s programmes and 
being a part of the WaterNet fraternity (see Bolding and Alba, this issue, for reflections).15 
While it may be true that the concept was first introduced as something imported from the global 
north, the impression among many of our interviewees was that it is no longer perceived as an imposed 
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 For downstream countries such as Mozambique, the entry point to IWRM was through transboundary concerns (see Alba 
and Bolding, this issue) and IWRM transboundary-style, was driven far more by internal concerns rather than being imposed 
from outside by donors and regional networks such as the GWP. In contrast, upstream riparian countries did not necessarily 
share the same interest in cooperation. 
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concept. Instead, it has become internalised and is seen as a means of promoting better water 
management, and overcoming fragmented legislation. 
The SADC experience shows IWRM can work and has opened the eyes of a lot of people in the region. It’s 
wrong to say that it’s just because of donor money. Of course, I am aware that development cooperation 
has the tendency to lose itself in papers, workshops, etc. If you do this, then there is no meaning at the 
grassroots. Regardless of the label, it is important to work in a multidisciplinary way and bring in the best 
people and address the key priorities of the people, member states and local communities. Overall though, 
we have moved from the early days when we wanted a 'one size fits all kind of solution' to now 
acknowledging that context matters, i.e. IWRM plans must address the particular country and also need to 
be relevant (Interview, November 2014). 
Many of the donors as well as southern African policy-makers interviewed also saw IWRM as a set of 
principles and an approach rather than a blueprint. Despite the many problems associated with the 
framework, it is still held as a widespread attraction. They also pointed out to the positive spin offs, for 
example, the increased cooperation on transboundary rivers in the region, the increased acceptance of 
interdisciplinary approaches, and generally raising the profile of water in the various countries through 
reform processes. 
However, many interviewees did acknowledge the problems with donor fads: 
IWRM is still alive and kicking in southern Africa even though it may be dead in Europe with its obsession 
with Nexus, etc. We are at different levels with Europe. We had a meeting on the nexus, and a politician 
said – 'we are just grasping IWRM and now you are saying that donors want the nexus! What is the 
difference? And we haven’t even sorted out IWRM as yet!' And of course, we have donors coming to us 
and saying 'give us a project on the nexus', and because we don’t have the money, we have to find one (…) 
it’s the same with climate change (Interview with GWP-SA representative, July 2013). 
The donors we spoke to also echoed similar sentiments: "Everything is now climate change but I still 
make sure we are still talking about access to water" (interview, April 2014). While donors are moving 
onto other fads (such as water security, the green economy and so on), one wonders what will come 
next. Will the region be left to get on with its own concerns, or will it again have to negotiate and make 
sense of new fashions as they are mediated by donor-recipient relations and regional processes? 
A recurrent sentiment among many of our interviewees, both from the GWP, WaterNet, SADC and 
donors, was the notion that "I wish we could have 30 years to prove ourselves, not just ten". Many 
other informants say that it’s only been about ten years of reform, and that it is too early to say what 
the on-the-ground impacts are. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have demonstrated that regional dynamics have played a key role in IWRM’s trip from 
the global level to southern Africa. The particular economic, political and colonial processes outlined in 
this article have led to a kind of path dependency that has shaped both regionalism in southern Africa 
and also allowed for donor-led initiatives to build on existing networks, some that go back to the anti-
apartheid struggle. The geography of 15 river basins facilitated both cooperation amongst member 
states and attracted donor interventions which drew on the global zeitgeist of neoliberal water policies. 
National governments, for their part, were no passive spectators but often used IWRM to promote 
national interests in diverse ways, which often led to a tussle between the 'soft' and 'hard' aspects of 
IWRM. IWRM caught on in SADC due to the regional processes outlined in this article as well as strong 
donor agendas that were often aligned with existing national interests. While this is partly a story of an 
externally imposed concepts promoted through donor-funded processes, networks, fads and new and 
weak institutions propped up by donor money, it is also a story of negotiation and adaptation to 
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accommodate different and, often, diverging interests. Consequently, IWRM has now acquired a life of 
its own in southern Africa, despite shifting global trends and changing donor interests. 
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APPENDIX 1: IWRM TIMELINE 
The timeline contains the key dates for some global key events, regional policy and strategies, as well as 
a selected overview of some key policies and laws from the countries studied in this Special Issue. 
 
PERIOD ACTIVITY WHO/WHAT 
1950s Hydraulic mission  
(e.g. building of Kariba) 
National governments and 
colonial administrations 
1960s Independence struggles and Cold War by proxy  
1970s Commission report in South Africa  
1980s SADCC created 
Start of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
Start of Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade 
 
1991 Mozambique: Lei de Agua  
1992 ICWE Dublin Conference 
UN Conference on Environment and Development Rio 
Earth Summit 
The SADCC becomes the SADC 
 
 
 
 
1993 World Bank Water Resources Strategy 
World Bank Meeting Victoria Falls 
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1994 Lake Victoria Environmental Management Programme 
(LVEMP) 
 
1995 Protocol on Shared Watercourses in SADC region 
Uganda Water Statute 
Sida Water Strategy 
 
1996 SADC sets up WSCUs – Water Sector Coordination 
Units 
 
Council of Water Ministers decides to draw up fist 
Regional Strategic Plan 
Global Water Partnership (GWP) created 
Initiation of CapNet 
Set up in Maseru, Lesotho, but 
then moved to Gaborone, 
Botswana in 2002 
Each country asked to come up 
with national situation report – 
SADC’s development partners 
financed several of these 
studies. Funded by UNDP 
1997 EU-SADC Conference on Shared River Basins, Maseru, 
May 1997. 
UN Convention on non-navigational uses of 
watercourses 
South Africa Water Services Act 
Uganda Water Act 
1st World Water Forum 
UNDP support.  
1998 South Africa National Water Act 
Zimbabwe Water Act 
(UNDP Roundtable in Geneva) 
 
1999 Expert workshop in Maseru 
First SADC (Water Division) Regional Strategic Action 
Plan I (1999-2004) 
WSRG formed at the initiative of UNDP  
 
2000 WaterNet and WARFSA created 
GWP-Southern Africa (GWPSA) launched, 1st regional 
arm of GWP 
1st WaterNet/WARFSA/GWPSA symposium 
Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in SADC 
region 
AfDB published IWRM strategy 
2nd World Water Forum – World Water Vision 
 
2001 DANIDA water strategy  
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 
Johannesburg 
CapNet launched  
Renewed commitment to IWRM 
and agreement that countries 
should draft national IWRM 
plans 
Integrated water resources 
management and water 
efficiency plans by 2005 
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2003 
 
IWRM figures as key issue in World Water Forum (and 
river basin management) 
Revised Protocol enters into force 
 
 
2004 South Africa: 1st National Water Resources Strategy 
(NWRS) published 
 
2005 SADC Regional Water Policy 
RSAP II 
 
2008 Conference on IWRM in South Africa 
GWP assessment of IWRM status and progress in 
SADC 
 
2009 Tanzania Water Resources Management Act  
2011 CIWA established 
RSAP III 
The Cooperation in 
International Waters in Africa 
(CIWA) is a multi-donor trust 
fund established in 2011 and 
represents a partnership 
between the World Bank and 
the governments of Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom 
3rd RSAP emphasised and 
groundwater management 
 
APPENDIX  2. TIMELINE OF TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER COMMISSIONS, AUTHORITIES AND AGENCIES 
1969 Kunene Permanent Joint Technical 
Commission (PJTC) 
 
1983 Inco-Maputo Tripartite Permanent 
Technical Committee 
The Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee 
(TPTC) was established in 1983 and is 
collaboration between three SADC member 
states namely, South Africa, Mozambique and 
Swaziland. The committee manages the water 
flow of the Inkomati River and Maputo River 
specifically during times of drought and flood, 
and for recommending measures to protect and 
develop these water resources. 
1994 The Permanent Okavango River 
Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) 
agreement signed  
Sida heavily involved (through The Every River 
Has Its People Project).  
1999 International Commission of Congo-
Oubangui-Sangha (CICOS) 
AfDB 
2000 
 
ORASECOM signed Danube, Rhine, Mekong as models. GTZ heavily 
involved. 
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2003 LIMCOM 
Botswana, Mozambique, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, 
 
2004 ZAMCOM agreement signed ZAMCOM IWRM strategy supported by Norad, 
Danida and Sida 
2008 Lake Tanganyika Authority UNDP 
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